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Pinter Thesis 
~ Kind of Alaska and No Man's Land, two of Harold Pinter's recent plays, 
demonstrate the range between naturalistic and stylized elements in his work. l 
In ~ Kind of Alaska, the situation and characters cohere in a believable if 
unusual representation of reality. No Man's Land, however, resists this 
treatment as a naturalistic set of circumstances. Although the dialogue of 
both plays is composed of ordinary, spoken language, its effects resist the 
label of realism; one critic has called Pinter a "hyperrealist" and "a 
virtuoso of phonomimesis.,,2 (By "ordinary language" I mean language that 
people use in conversational discourse as opposed to specialized types of 
language.) Through an analysis of these two plays, this essay will attempt to 
uncover some of the ways in which Pinter's drama employs ordinary speech to 
yield extraordinary effects. 
Like most other Pinter critics, Austin Quigley identifies this puzzling 
effect of Pinter's language as a central issue in his work. 3 Quigley 
identifies a general trend in Pinter criticism of treating this quality as 
something mysterious and almost magical: "These [terms describing Pinter's 
language] are variously described as language that transcends the expressible, 
language that abandons the expressible, language that conveys things in spite 
of what it expresses. ,.4 Such views suggest that Pinter's language has the 
unique property of communicating one thing while meaning another. 
The problem with this idea, Quigley suggests, is that it wrongly assumes 
that there is a normal, core counterpart to the supposedly extraordinary way 
in which Pinter uses language. S "Normal" here refers to a supposed type of 
ordinary language that occupies a place of logical priority over other types 
of ordinary language. Quigley, basing his argument on Wittgenstein's later 
work, denies the notion that language has core uses and peripheral uses. 6 His 
account of what makes Pinter's language interesting is that it is not 
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IIprimarily referential ll ; rather, liThe language of a Pinter play functions 
primarily as a means of dictating and reinforcing relationships.1I7 In short, 
there is nothing mysterious or transcendent about Pinter's use of ordinary 
language. 
Closely linked to this quality of Pinter's language is the issue of 
exposition. For most dramatists, exposition is a simple matter of conveying 
undisputed facts about the characters and situation, usually at an early point 
in the play. In Pinter's plays, on the other hand, exposition is never taken 
for granted; primary importance is often given to veiling, unveiling, and 
disputing facts about the characters. The search for identity through one's 
past motivates the action in both a Kind of Alaska and No Man's Land. 
Consequently, the main type of action in both plays is speaking. Against 
charges that this type of dramatic strategy becomes a gimmick, Quigley writes, 
In depicting the characters' efforts to complete or 
renegotiate the consensus in these areas, the plays 
chart the progressive development of the character 
relationships, not simply the progressive revelation 
of them. 8 
Again, the use of language as a tool of negotiation as well as an index 
of relationships helps to yield this effect. But just how this function of 
language leads to extraordinary or dislocating effects is not clear from 
Quigley's analysis. In contrast to his work, then, this essay will use the 
view that speech is a form of contextual action (speech acts) as a tool for 
analyzing Pinter's language. This approach will offer a more rigorous and 
satisfying account of just what traditional critics find mystifying about 
Pinter's language. 
My purpose, however, lies not only in a desire to contribute insight to 
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the critical canon on Pinter. I also wish to offer some insight into the 
literary application of speech act theory. Among the writers I will discuss 
are Austin, Searle, Altieri, Pratt, Derrida, and Fish. This application leads 
to my belief that drama is the literary genre to which speech act theory is 
most appropriate and applicable (in much the same way as the poem serves as 
the New Critical model). I will begin with a brief introduction to speech act 
theory, move on to my analysis of the plays, make general inferences about the 
plays and the theory, and then reach for conclusions. 
Speech act theory originated with J.L. Austin's How To Do Things With 
Words. 9 He begins by classifying "performatives, " statements for which "the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action. ,,10 He opposes 
performatives to "constatives," which merely assert. For example, he writes, 
"To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 'I 
name, &c' .,,11 Contained within each performative, he claims, are three 
distinct actions: the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts: 
We perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent 
to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and 
reference ... Second, we said that we also perform 
illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning, 
undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances which have a certain 
(conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also perform 
perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or achieve 
hy saying something ... 12 
According to Austin, performative utterances are neither true nor false; 
rather, they are successful or infelicitous. 13 Either they work as completed 
actions or they don't. Central to the analysis of speech acts is the idea of 
context: 
Once we realize that what we have to study is not the 
sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech 
situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility 
of not seeing that stating is performing an act. 14 
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The implication of this point, in addition to emphasis on context, is that 
Austin is extending his category of performative (i.e., actions like naming a 
boat) to include all utterances. Austin himself later denies this, still 
clinging to an admittedly tenuous distinction between performatives and 
constatives (mere statements of fact).15 
John Searle, Austin's closest student and follower, makes some important 
contributions to this view of language in his Speech Acts. 16 First, he denies 
the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary actions (SA, p. 23 n.). 
Second, he denies Austin's belief that certain types of speech acts are 
logically connected to certain words. He calls this the speech act fallacy, 
and it takes this form: "'The word R is used to perform speech act a'" (SA, 
p. 137). He finds an example of this fallacy in Austin's analysis: !I 'The 
word 'know' is used to give guarantees. 1,,17 The point is not that "know" 
doesn't give guarantees, but that it doesn't always serve that purpose and 
that guarantees can be made without it (SA, p. 137-138). 
Searle incorporates Austin's insights into a more systematic and rigorous 
philosophy of language. According to him, a given utterance can contain an 
utterance act, a propositional act, an illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary 
act (SA, p 24-25). He further subdivides the category of illocutionary act 
into the following categories: requesting, asserting, questioning, thanking, 
advising, warning, greeting, and congratulating (SA, p 66-67).,,18 In my 
analysis of the plays, I will use primarily Searle's version of speech act 
theory. Later I will modify and expand Searle's analysis in order to provide 
a more complete picture of literary speech acts in drama. 
Illocutionary speech acts, primarily of asserting and questioning, are 
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the central events in A Kind of Alaska, the longest play from the collection 
Other Places. The action begins when Deborah wakes up from almost thirty 
years of a waking coma caused by sleeping sickness. For Deborah, her sister 
Pauline, and Hornby (her doctor, recently married to Pauline), speech is 
critical to these first few moments of consciousness. When Deborah first 
speaks, Hornby asks, "Can you hear me?" and she answers, "Are you speaking?" 
(AKA, p 5-6). The illocutionary force of these questions is clear (probing, 
information-seeking), but they are meant to test for a response rather than to 
find a yes or no answer. Deborah's reply then, is both an affirmative answer 
to Hornby's question and a request for a similar response (SA, 38). She 
refers to Hornby ("you") apparently in order to determine whether he is really 
there. Her difficulty results from her uncertainty about how to make a fully 
appropriate response to Hornby's question, and whether what she perceives is 
actually happening. 
The main interest of the play lies in careful speaking and listening; 
Deborah's goal is to discern and integrate the facts of her situation, and 
Pauline and Hornby try to assist her in this process. There is a great deal 
at stake, then, in everything the characters say. Deborah often ignores or 
refuses to believe what Hornby and Pauline tell her; they, on the other hand, 
avoid saying anything that they think may shock her. 
For much of the play the characters talk past each other. Despite his 
denials, Deborah suspects Hornby of raping her: "Have you had your way with 
me?" (AKA, p. 12). She pretends to disbelieve Hornby's denial and goes on to 
assert that he has done so. The uncetainty of her next comment, though, 
suggests that the force of her statement was information-seeking, as if it 
were a question: "I sound childish. Out of ... tune" (AKA, p. 12).19 This is 
a case in which exposition becomes central to the drama: the audience's 
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uncertainty about whether she has been raped parallels Deborah's; it only 
becomes clear that he has not raped her after weighing her apparent 
unreliability in comparison with Hornby in the context of the whole play. 
She also denies that Pauline is her sister and that she herself is a 
grown woman. Her voice varies between that of a child, an adolescent, and a 
confused adult. Sometimes she catalogues what she remembers: "I've not seen 
Daddy today. He's funny. He makes me laugh. He runs with me. We play with 
balloons" (AKA, p. 8). At the end she tries to report what she's been told 
with dismay: 
You say I have been asleep. You say I am now awake. You 
say I have not awoken from the dead. You say I was not 
dreaming then and am not dreaming now. You say I have 
always been alive and am alive now. You say I am a woman. 
(AKA, p. 40) 
This speech is an assertion about the content of Hornby's assertions; taken 
literally, it appears to be a successful assimilation of what Deborah has been 
told. But her emphatic repetition of "you say" suggests an element of 
disbelief. The speech that follows reveals a failure to integrate all of what 
she has been told; the voice of the woman contains the voice of the girl: 
She doesn't go to her ballet classes any more. Mummy and 
Daddy and Estelle are on a world cruise. They've stopped 
off in Bangkok. It'll be my birthday soon. I think I have 
the matter in proportion. (AKA, p. 40) 
In a Kind of Alaska, dramatic tension lies in the success or failure of the 
characters in communicating with each other. Along with this runs the 
question of whether what the characters say is true. Pauline tells Deborah 
that her family is on a cruise, but later Hornby tells her that her father is 
blind and her mother is dead. 
In Speech Acts, Searle outlines the following conditions for an 
illocutionary speech act to be meaningful, or successful: 
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~ utters sentence T and means it (i.e., means literally 
what he says)= 
~ utters T and 
(~) ~ intends (i-I) the utterance ~ of T to produce 
in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the 
states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules 
of T obtain. (Call this effect the illocutionary 
effect, IE) 
(k) ~ intends ~ to produce IE by means of the recognition of 
i-I. 
(£) ~ intends that i-I will be recognized in virtue of (by 
means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the rules 
governing (the elements of) T. (SA, pp. 49-50) 
This analysis shows that the mere utterance of a single sentence requires the 
successful satisfaction of complicated conditions. In this play, conditions 
(~) (£) are most often called into question. 
Hornby and Pauline find it difficult to achieve the illocutionary effect 
in Deborah, because she either can't or doesn't want to accept the rules 
required by conditions (~) and (£). They may utter sentences successfully, 
but the fact that Deborah is older than she feels may prevent her from 
understanding. For a woman whose most recent waking memories are thirty years 
old, simple acts of communicating are no trivial matter. Because of this 
bizarre condition, the "rules" of each statement T in the above analysis are 
called into question. For example, they can't decide whether to lie or tell 
her the truth: 
Pauline: Shall I tell her lies or the truth? 
Hornby: Both. (AKA, p. 27) 
This problem, along with Deborah's inability to understand and manipulate the 
rules of meaning, makes ~ Kind of Alaska a play in which exposition occupies a 
central place in characterizing and dramatizing the relationships of the 
characters. 
Deborah's problem of communication, on the other hand, stems from 
forgetting the rules of speech, her failure to understand her current 
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condition, confusing children's and adults' speech patterns, and a dim 
understanding of her unconscious experience. Her speech is muddled because 
she has a poor grasp of the rules that govern speaking as well the experiences 
about which she speaks. Consequently, she uses poetic or non-literal imagery 
to describe her experience variously as the sea, the desert, prison, a "vast 
series of halls" in which "glass reflects glass" and dancing "in narrow 
spaces" (AKA, pp. 13, 14, 17, 25, 39). 
Interestingly, the two main physical actions performed by Deborah are 
accompanied by long, poetic speeches that refer to her unconscious state. 
First, she illustrates her sensation of dancing "in narrow spaces" by getting 
up and demonstrating the dance. Second, toward the end of the play, she 
experiences what threatens to be a relapse into her former condition: 
She begins to flick her cheek [ .... J They're closing 
the walls in. Yes [ .... J During the course of this 
speech her body becomes hunchbacked. 
Let me out. Stop it [ .... J They're closing my face. 
Chains and padlocks. (AKA, p. 38) 
The combination of metaphorical ("the walls") and colloquial (the ambiguous 
"They're") elements in her language yield the mixed effect of naturalistic and 
literary language that is characteristic of Pinter. 
For Deborah, the outlook for successful communication seems paradoxically 
more optimistic than for the other two. Her dialogue has the effect of being 
intuitively lucid and communicative. To accommodate this to the speech act 
model, the rules governing her utterances could be changed to allow for 
metaphorical language. That is, we could rewrite the rules for a successful 
speech act on non-literal or metaphorical terms; this would be problematic, 
since non-literal language relies on complex and inherently ambiguous rule-
governed conventions such as metaphor. 
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In his essay on metaphor, Searle expresses this point, namely, that in 
order for metaphorical utterances to be uttered and understood, there must be 
"shared strategies" and "shared principles" between the speaker and listener: 
The question, 'How do metaphors work?' is a bit like 
the question, 'How does one thing remind us of another 
thing?' There is no single answer to this question, 0 
though similarity plays a major role in answering both2 
Searle offers a set of principles that account for how metaphors work; they 
are summarized in his seventh principle: 
The hearer's task is not to go from 'li is £' to li is R' 
but to go from 'li £-relation~' to 'li R-relation ~' 
and the latter task is formally rather different from 
the former because, for example, our similarity principles 
in the former case will enable him to find a property that 
li and £ things have in common, namely, R.21 
Conventions like metaphor, then, are governed by their own sets of rules. 
The appeal they hold for literary works like a Kind of Alaska relates to two 
things: first, the metaphors provide Deborah with an avenue for expressing 
her unprecedented experiences--they allow her to describe what has never been 
described; second, the relational process of interpreting these metaphors is 
different from and more complicated than interpreting ordinary referring 
expressions. Differences as well as similarities between the terms enrich 
this interpretive experience. At the risk of painting in very broad strokes, 
I would say that this type of process yields much of what is aesthetically 
satisfying in this playas well as in all other literature. 
a Kind of Alaska is primarily about the difficulty in meeting the 
requirements for a successful speech act of assertion or questioning. 
Although the end of the play is optimistic about Deborah's recovery, it is 
clear from her words that Pauline's and Hornby's speech acts have often failed 
in creating uptake, or the illocutionary effect, in Deborah. The most 
compelling moments in the play involve such lapses of communication. For 
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instance, after Deborah denies Pauline's claim that she is a widow by saying 
she is mad, Hornby steps in and again tries to tell her what has happened, 
slipping into metaphorical language: 
Your mind has not been damaged. It was merely suspended, it 
took up a temporary habitation ... in a kind of Alaska [ .... J 
Your ventured into quite remote ... utterly foreign ... 
territories. You kept on the move. And I charted your 
itinerary. (AKA, p. 35) 
This passage comes from the longest speech whose purpose it is to inform 
Pauline of what has happened. Her response neither confirms nor denies the 
uptake of these speech acts of assertion: "I want to go home [ .... J Is it my 
birthday soon?" (AKA, p. 35). 
As I mentioned before, this play lies quite securely in the category of 
naturalism; the characters and events are credible imitations of ordinary 
reality. Yet the play has profoundly non-naturalistic, stylized effects. 
Among the most obvious of these is the sense that the non-literal or poetic 
language communicates more successfully than the literal language. The 
reasons for this are understandable. First, there is no precedent for 
Deborah's condition, so there is no vocabulary with which to describe it; thus 
Hornby's quite apt phrase that Deborah's mind has been "in a kind of Alaska." 
Second, Hornby and Pauline want to avoid shocking Deborah, so they often 
resort to euphemisms and lies (e.g., Pauline's claim that the family is on a 
"world cruise" [AKA, p. 28]). Pinter's paradoxical success in this play is 
that he chooses a naturalistic medium to discuss problems of communication and 
the communicative triumph of literary over literal language. 
Although No Man's Land is vastly more stylized and self-consciously 
literary than A Kind of Alaska, the two plays share the same basic concerns. 
-11-
First, both plays are primarily about speech acts; in the latter, speech 
serves to navigate an extremely delicate situation, while in No Man's Land 
language becomes a sophisticasted tool of power in the hands of literati 
(Spooner and Hirst) and a crude weapon for lower-class thugs (Foster and 
Briggs). 
Second, sexual and linguistic elements are linked as metaphors for power 
in both plays. In ~ Kind of Alaska, Deborah shifts from an awareness that 
Hornby is speaking to a suspicion that he has "had your way with me" (AKA, p. 
12). Control of speech suggests a position of advantage, and that, in turn, 
suggests a sexual advantage. Conversely, this accusation puts Hornby in a 
defensive position and gives her temporary control of the situation. As my 
analysis shows, the effectiveness of this metaphor (which is made by Pinter 
rather than the character) derives from the process of interpretation. The 
audience must infer either that the character has been raped or that her 
experience of Hornby bears some relation to the experience of rape. Further, 
the fact that Pauline and Hornby are married suggests the element of the love 
triangle that is so prominent in Betrayal, Old Times, The Basement, and Tea 
Party.22 In No Man's Land, sexual and linguistic finesse become 
interchangeable in the power struggle between Spooner and the other three. 
Third, figures of speech, colloquial sayings, and literary allusions 
receive special attention in both plays. As speech acts, colloquialisms 
suggest familiarity and informality; for Deborah they often signify a coy, 
girlish stance: "Was I bold as brass?", "ginger boy," and "flibbertigibbet." 
At other times she uses elaborate language that expresses precocity and 
superiority, over Pauline, for example: 
And she's only ... thirteen. I keep telling her I'm not 
prepared to tolerate her risible, her tendentious, her 
eclectic, her ornate, her rococo insinuations and 
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garbled inventions. (AKA, p. 21) 
Spooner makes his mastery of and admiration for ornate language explicit: "A 
metaphor. Things are looking up" (NML, p. 94). For him and Hirst these uses 
of language become rhetorical weapons in an oblique struggle for control over 
each other. 
Finally, both plays contain soliloquies in which unconscious states 
(dreams, sleeping sickness) suggesting a state of permanence are described. 
In both cases, these states seem indeterminate and evade precise description; 
it is as if language is inadequate to communicate this type of experience 
directly. Metaphorical descriptions approximate the experience by relating it 
to something more familiar. Interestingly, in both plays this experience 
relates to a state of coldness as well as permanence. 23 Both plays are in a 
sense about performing speech acts, partly because these permanent states are 
difficult to describe. This emphasis on permanence also contributes to what 
distinguishes Pinter's dialogue from the ordinary speech after which it is 
modelled. This topic, insofar as it is characteristically literary, is 
indicated by what Charles Altieri calls "illocutionary operators which invoke 
methods of projection"; that is, it is one of the signals that this discourse 
is literary.24 This projection in turn helps signal the literariness of the 
text on Altieri's institutional and procedural definition of literature. 25 
No Man's Land presents a complicated picture of friendship, cruelty, role 
reversal, memory, and permanence. Like Davies in The Caretaker, Spooner is 
the outsider who tries to win the favor of his host and contemporary, Hirst. 26 
His only weapon in this struggle is the power of speech, and he successfully 
dominates the conversation with Hirst in the first half of Act I. When Foster 
and Briggs enter, however, Spooner immediately loses this advantage. The two 
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younger men shower verbal abuse on him in a way that recalls the menace of 
Pinter's earlier plays (especially Goldberg and McCann in The Birthday 
Party).27 In the second act, Hirst and Spooner exchange a stunning shower of 
verbal blows based on their respective versions of past love affairs. Hirst 
effects a kind of role reversal with Spooner in Act II (reminiscent of The 
Basement and Tea Party) by gaining the verbal upper hand and eventually 
reducing him to a poor man pleading for employment. The play concludes after 
Hirst and his lackeys clearly shut out Spooner by ignoring his offers of help, 
which are actually pathetic pleas. 
The play's opening indicates its two dominant forms of action: talking 
and drinking. After preparing drinks, finishing them, and going for seconds, 
Spooner resumes a conversation they began on the way back from the pub where 
they met: 
There are some people who appear to be strong, whose idea of 
what strength consists of is persuasive, but who inhabit 
the idea and not the fact. What they possess is not 
strength but expertise [ .... J It takes a man of intelligence 
and perception to stick a needle through that posture and 
discern the essential flabbiness of the stance. I am 
such a man. (NML, p. 78) 
For Spooner, strength lies in control of language. The distinction Spooner 
makes here may be described as one between actions and words, but the fact 
that his main actions in the play are speech acts (primarily assertions) 
undercuts this distinction. Indeed, the speech from which this is taken is 
composed of assertive illocutionary speech acts that are rhetorical in nature 
(i.e., they are intended to produce the perlocutionary effect of trust and 
good will toward him). 
Language becomes a subject of conversation with a witticism made about 
Spooner: "A wit once entitled me a betwixt twig peeper. A most clumsy 
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construction, I thought" (NML, p. 80). This assertion, which is followed by a 
second assertion about the manner of the first, has a double effect: it draws 
attention to the subject of language style while avoiding the implications of 
his "peeping." In response to Hirst's terse "What a wit," he goes on to 
maintain, "All we have left is the English language. Can it be salvaged?" 
(NML, p. 80). Hirst's reply is that its salvation rests in Spooner, to which 
Spooner condescendingly responds, "It's uncommonly kind of you to say so. In 
you too, perhaps, although I haven't sufficient evidence to go on, as yet" 
(NML, p. 81). 
By performing such evaluative, assertive speech acts about Hirst (who is 
a poet) and language, Spooner begins to gain an advantage over him. The above 
reply also illustrates his frequent use of sarcasm (the multiple references to 
"kindness," which Steven Gale suggests allude to a Streetcar Named Desire28 ) 
that has the effect of being patronizing and belittling. These overstated 
uses of "kindness" become a blatantly unkind gesture. As Spooner gains an 
advantage, though, he gradually makes his motivations clear (as in the 
"boatman" speech) and consequently makes himself vulnerable to the rejection 
and cruelty he faces later. 
Spooner and Hirst make numerous literary allusions to Eliot, Tennessee 
Williams, and Shakespeare which Gale refers to as "substitutes for content. ,,29 
In other words, he interprets them as sketchy, unfinished ideas on the part of 
Pinter, implying that a better play would suppress these allusions and offer 
original formulations of "no man's land." This view, however, overlooks the 
fact that the characters using the allusions are literati; the allusions are 
flat and pedantic only because the characters who use them are as well. 
The important sexual motif of the play surfaces as Spooner denies that 
his peeping is voyeurism: "I don't peep on sex. That's gone forever" (NML, 
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p. 81). Sex, for Spooner, is characterized by transience as well as power, 
and he claims to shun it in favor of the more permanent realm of linguistic 
art. Explaining that "Experience is a paltry thing," he maintains, "I myself 
can do any graph of experience you wish [ .... J I am a poet. I am interested 
in where I am eternally present and active" (NML, p. 82). This disregard for 
historical fact provides a clue in the search to understand Spooner's 
confusing remarks. Many of his speech acts appear to be assertions, but they 
are often deceitful, rhetorical devices. 30 
In keeping with this quest for permanence, Spooner (despite his denials 
in the first act) seeks to join Hirst's "No man's land" which "does not 
move ... or change ... or grow old" (NML, p. 96). After Spooner tells Hirst how 
he met a Hungarian who impressed him because "he possessed a measure of 
serenity the like of which I had never encountered," he continues, "And I met 
you at the same pub tonight" (NML, p. 87). Everything Spooner says to Hirst 
is intended to persuade him of his merit and potential value as a personal 
secretary. He realizes that there is something unchanging about Hirst and 
embarks on a campaign to control him through parasitism. It is a war waged on 
a verbal battleground for a metaphysical prize: "I could advance, reserve my 
defences [ ... J call up the cavalry" (NML, p. 82). Whether this permanence is 
worthwhile is questionable, and this uncertainty makes the struggle a balanced 
one. While Spooner seeks the comfort of Hirst's unchanging environment, Hirst 
envies Spooner's freedom: "It's a long time since we had a free man in this 
house" (NML, p. 83). 
For Spooner and the other characters, there is little differentiation 
between past and present, fantasy and fact. His belated self-introduction in 
the middle of Act I, although told in the present tense, clearly represents a 
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combination of nostagia and lyrical romance: 
Young poets come to me. They read me their verses [ .... J 
But with the windows open to the garden, my wife pouring 
long glasses of squash, with ice, on a summer evening, 
young voices occasionally lifted in unaccompanied ballad 
[ •.. J what can ail? I mean who can gainsay us? What 
quarrel can be found with what is, £g fond, a gesture 
towards the sustenance and preservation of art, through art 
to virtue? (NML, p. 90) 
By recalling the "bucolic life" of the aristocratic literati and making 
numerous sexual slanders, Spooner gains influence over Hirst (NML, p. 91). 
Spooner's intuitive sensitivity to Hirst's weaknesses, rather than adherence 
to historical truth, is the mechanism whereby he exercises this power. 
When Spooner's recollection of the gilded past strikes a chord in Hirst, 
he immediately seizes this advantage by making a barrage of obscene 
insinuations in cricket jargon about his wife ("did she google?" (NML, p. 
92».31 When Hirst fails to answer, Spooner says, 
I begin to wonder whether truly accurate and therefore 
essentially poetic definition means anything to you 
at all. I begin to wonder whether you truly did love 
her [ ... J I have seriously questioned these propositions 
and find them threadbare. (NML, p. 93) 
The equation of "accurate" and "essentially poetic" speech explains Spooner's 
indifference to the historical past and his complete dedication to literary 
language. Finally, Hirst throws his glass and expresses his despair: 
"Tonight ... my friend ... you find me in the last lap of a race ... I had long 
forgotten to run" (NML, p. 94). Spooner continues his cruel manipulation, 
again with explicit reference to speech: "A metaphor. Things are looking 
up," and later, "you lack the essential quality of manliness, which is to put 
your money where your mouth is" (NML, pp. 94-95). Then he makes his sales 
pitch: "Let me perhaps be your boatman [ .... J In other words, never disdain a 
helping hand, especially one of such rare quality" (NML, p. 95).32 Hirst 
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replies by making the titular speech and crawling out of the room (NML, p. 
96) . 
When Hirst reappears, he pretends not to know Spooner and gains conrol of 
the conversation with his speeches about the dream of the drowning person and 
the past, which is symbolized by his photo album (NML, pp. 106-109). His 
dream narrative resembles Deborah's account of her experiences: 
It was blinding. I remember it. I've forgotten. By all 
that's sacred and holy. The sounds stopped. It was 
freezing. There's a gap in me. I can't fill it [ .... J 
They're blotting me out. Who is doing it? I'm suffocating 
[ .... J Someone is doing me to death. (NML, p. 108) 
Like Deborah's "chains and padlocks" speech, this speech combines the 
colloquial, ambiguous "they" with poetic elements, suggesting an ambiguous, 
anonymous, danger. The shift from past to present (which is typical of this 
play) indicate Hirst's timeless condition of despair and drinking. His 
permanent restriction to verbal action contributes to his bad memory and 
failure to notice his surroundings: "I am sitting here forever [ .... J I wish 
you'd damnwell tell me what night it is [ .... J There's too much solitary 
shi ttery" (NML, p. 108). 
Hirst's disposition is completely different the next day. As if he had 
searched through his photo album to remember Spooner's name, he greets him as 
Charles, an old friend (NML, p. 126). He adopts an aggressive and mock-
friendly manner as he recalls the war: "You did say you had a good war, 
didn't you?" (NML, pp. 127-129). After the two men accuse each other of 
various sexual aberrations, Spooner angers Hirst by referring to one of his 
own poems: "It is written in terza rima, a form which, if you will forgive my 
saying so, you have never been able to master" (NML, p. 135). Hirst's 
response is to order a drink and express angry disbelief: 
You are clearly a lout. The Charles Wetherby I knew was 
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a gentleman. I see a figure reduced [ .... J I do not 
understand ... and I see it all about me ... continually ... 
how the most sensitive and cultivated of men can so easily 
change, almost overnight, into the bully, the cutpurse, the 
brigand. In illY day nobody changed. (NML, p. 136, 
emphasis mine) 
But if Spooner is protean, so is Hirst, at least with respect to his 
moods and memories. The permanence he refers to here is unlike his own, which 
is the bleak "no man's land"; in fact, all indications are that he is one of 
these fallen cultivated men; he has left a successful past and become a 
failure and a drunk. He tells Spooner to "tender the dead" partly because he 
is almost dead himself, like the forgotten tennis balls he describes later: 
"They are lost there, given up for dead, centuries old" (NML, p. 139). 
Spooner poses a threat to the job security of Foster and Briggs, Hirst's 
two henchmen. In contrast to the educated speech of Spooner and Hirst, their 
dialect suggests that they are lower-class, and in the Peter Hall production 
they were played with Cockney accents. 33 When they first enter, Foster tries 
to alienate Spooner by pretending his name is Friend and by repeatedly asking 
him what he's drinking (NML, pp. 97-100). Briggs, who is older than Foster, 
is less forceful but cruder: "Whereas he's a pintpot attendant in The Bull's 
Head. And a pisspot attendant too .... I've seen Irishmen chop his balls off" 
(NML, pp. 110-111). Despite Hirst's financial and intellectual superiority 
over Briggs and Foster, they wield considerable control over him: 
Foster: Listen chummybum. We protect this gentleman against 
corruption, against men of craft, against men of evil, 
we could destroy you without a glance, we take care of 
this gentleman, we do it out of love. (NML, p. 111) 
It is possible that Spooner fails to control Hirst because he doesn't use the 
cruel, crude speech tactics of Foster and Briggs; ultimately, verbal 
sophistication loses to the language of violent action and domination; Foster, 
who says, "I don't usually talk. I don't have to," says of Spooner, "Why 
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don't I kick his head off and have done with it?" (pp. 111-112). 
Briggs' feelings toward Foster are strong and mixed. In Act I he says of 
him: "Neurotic poof. He prefers idleness. Unspeakable ponce [ .... J He's 
nothing but a vagabond cock" (NML, p. 114). But the Bo1sover Street speech 
expresses affection and insecurity toward Foster: 
We're old friends, Jack and myself. We met at a street 
corner. I should tell you he'll deny this account [ .... J 
A car drew up. It was him. He asked me the way to Bo1sover 
street. I told him Bolvover street was in the middle of an 
intricate one-way system [ .... J All he's got to do is to 
reverse into the underground car park, change gear, go 
straight on, and he'll find himself in Bolsover street with 
no trouble at all [ .... J I told him I knew one or two people 
who'd been wandering up and down Bolsover street for years. 
They'd wasted their bloody youth there [ .... J I remember 
saying to him: This trip you've got in mind, drop it, it 
could prove fatal [ .... J I took all this trouble with him 
because he had a nice open face. (NML, p. 120) 
This speech epitomizes Pinter's refusal to treat exposition as a mere vehicle 
for undisputed background facts. The breathtaking leaps of content, tense, 
and personal opinion here illustrate the way in which Pinter combines 
naturalistic and stylized elements to yield a speech that implicitly 
characterizes the speaker. 
The speech takes three turns: first, from an account of how he met 
Foster to a lengthy set of directions to a London street (accompanied by a 
shift to present tense); second, from the directions to social commentary; and 
third, from this general comment to his motivations for helping Foster. Thus, 
the naturalistic detail of the street directions veils a self-defining 
justification for his fondness for Foster. The speech acts here are 
assertions, but Briggs' warning that Foster will deny them suspends the 
illocutionary effect in the audience and creates a feeling of doubt that calls 
for careful and critical listening. Briggs' defensiveness suggests that he 
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could be lying, which in turn suggests that he is insecure and ambivalent 
about his with Foster. 
All the main elements of the play--drinking, Spooner's pleas, Hirst's 
reveries, and the henchmen's complaints--intensify and recur as the play draws 
to a close. Like Spooner's repeated use of the statement "I have known this 
before" (a possible echo of Eliot's Prufrock), this repetition adds to the 
feeling that the action is a self-repeating, self-sustaining cycle (NML, p. 
96).34 To Spooner's final plea, which is his longest and spoken in the 
language of chivalry, Hirst replies: 
Let us change the subject. 
Pause 
For the last time. 
Pause 
What have I said? 
Foster: You said you're changing the subject for the last 
time. 
Hirst: But what does that mean? [ .... J 
Foster: So that nothing else will happen forever [ .... J We'll be 
with you. Briggs and me. (NML, pp. 149-152) 
Hirst concludes that he didn't see anyone drowning in the water, Spooner 
echoes his earlier speech by telling him he's in "no man's land," and Hirst 
answers with the closing line, "I'll drink to that" (NML, p. 153). 
In a sense, nothing has happened here besides drinking, rej ection, breakdmvn 
of communication, and articulate expression of despair. Gale takes this point 
quite far: " ... some of the dialogue seems merely to be witty conversation," 
and "These are men who no longer act--they talk.,,35 But if speech is a form 
of action, a great deal more has taken place. Spooner has gained and lost the 
confidence of Hirst; Hirst has "come to a conclusion" about "certain matters" 
(namely, to adhere to his current condition forever); Foster and Briggs have 
included themselves in Hirst's hell while excluding Spooner. Still, the fact 
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that the characters often talk past each other makes this action seem idle; as 
John Bush Jones says, there are few predictable causal relationships among 
these actions. 36 The reliance on trite oracular and literary skills as forms 
of action perpetuates Hirst's eternal despair and reveals Spooner's 
vulnerability. 
Before making general inferences about drama and speech act theory, I 
will consider three main types of objection to Searle's theory in light of my 
analysis. I will refer to them and discuss them in order as follows: the 
Derridean objection, the philosophy of language objection, and the literary 
criticism objection. I will consider these objections in order and follow 
with a discussion of whether Searle's theory can accommodate them. 
In "Signature Event Context,,37 and the hilariously long-winded "Limited 
Inc abc ... ",38 Jaques Derrida levels several criticisms against speech act 
theory. The former essay addresses Austin's account, and the latter is a 
reply to Searle's objections to this essay in "A Reply to Derrida.,,39 Because 
of the radically different approaches of Derrida and Searle, this debate is 
extremely polemical, and they often write at cross-purposes. (Derrida admits 
this at the end of "Signature"; "Deconstruction cannot limit itself ... to a 
neutralization: it must ... practice an overturning of the classical opposition 
and a general displacement of the system.,,40) 
The primary objection is that Austin ignores what Derrida is always at 
pains to point out, namely, the "arbitrariness of the sign": 
Austin has not taken into account that which is in the 
structure of locution (and therefore before any illocutory 
or perlocutory determination) already bears within itself 




Could a performative statement succeed if its formulation 
did not repeat a 'coded' or iterable statement, in other 
words if the expressions I use to open a meeting, launch 
a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming 
to an iterable model, and therefore if they were not 
identifiable in a way as 'citation,?42 
He proposes a "new typology" in the study of utterances in which "different 
types of marks or chains of iterable marks" would replace intention as the 
center of attention. 43 That is, Derrida believes that the study of languge as 
a sign system takes logical priority over the study of language as speech 
acts. His emphasis on the uncertain meaning and interdependence of linguistic 
elements leads him to conclude that Austin's failure to acknowledge this flaws 
his case. 
Derrida's point is worth noting, but the assertion that the indeterminacy 
of signs logically precedes intended speech acts is like arguing that the 
chicken came before the egg; the relationship between speakers and language 
is dynamic, and neither intention nor signs should occupy center stage. As 
Searle says in "Reply" (which, as Derrida is at pains to indicate in "Limited 
Inc," is quite hotheaded), 
Iterability ... is not as Derrida seems to think something 
in conflict with the intentionality of linguistic acts ... 
it is the necessary presuPRosition of the forms which 
that intentionality takes. 4 
Derrida's objection, then, is not so much a threat to speech act theory as a 
plea for a competing interest in the study of language. Still, Pinter's 
dialogue often conveys the feeling that there is something inherently 
restrictive and inadequate about language, such that it sometimes leads a 
speaker into almost involuntary patterns of speech. For example, a 
deconstructionist might say that the conformity of Spooner's chivalric 
language "to an iterable model" and its status as a "citation" against its 
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historical background combines with the fact what he says is false and 
affected and so reveals his pathetic state (despite his persuasive intention): 
I am 1. I offer myself not abj ectly but with ancient pride. 
I come to you as a warrior. I shall be happy to serve 
you as my master. I bend my knee to your excellence. 
I am furnished with the qualities of piety, prudence, 
liberality and goodness. Decline them at your peril. 
(NML, p. 147) 
On Searle's account, this effect could be handled with an account of the 
illocutionary force and intended perlocutionary force of this language in this 
context. The first six sentences assert Spooner's qualities and presuppose 
Hirst's superiority, yielding the effect of obsequiousness, given the action 
and characterization that precede this speech. The last sentence is in the 
imperative and has the force of a (presumably idle) threat. The analysis of 
this speech as either a speech act or a Derridean linguistic citation, then, 
yields similar results. As Derrida suggests, the objection that Austin 
ignores some linguistic elements in his analysis doesn't refute speech act 
theory but rather points out an omission in the analysis. 
I now turn to the philosophy of language objection to Searle's theory. I 
will consider two versions of this type of objection, first from Dennis 
Stampers "Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts,,45 and second from 
David Holdcroft's Words and Deeds. 46 My purpose in considering this objection 
is primarily to test Searle's study of speech acts on its own terms, not to 
demonstrate its applicability to literary criticism. 
Dennis Stampe's quarrel with Searle centers on two of Searle's concepts, 
the ifid (illocutionary-force-indicating device, phrases like "I hereby 
promise") and the PE (Principle of Expressibility, i.e., "whatever can be 
meant can be said") (SA, p. 19). Stampe first claims that Searle elevates the 
ifid 
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to the status of a theoretical entity, so that those factors 
thought to determine illocutionary force where the 
performative prefix occurs may be held to operate to 
determine force even where no prefix or other ifid 
occurs--i.e., where the ifid is not 'overt. ,47 
Stampe's objection locates a central ambivalence in Searle's analysis. On the 
one hand, Searle wants to use the ifid as an implicit model of what is "MEANT 
by what one says in uttering a sentence that is inexplicit as to force. ,.48 On 
the other hand, Searle deliberately avoids this identification of meaning and 
force in his "speech act fallacy," an error that takes the form, "The word H 
is used to perform speech act ~., (SA, pp. 136-141). 
Moreover, Searle indicates at one point that a statement without a 
certain ifid may (in a given context) have the same illocutionary force as a 
statement without it. 49 On this context-centered interpretation of Searle, 
the ifid can be viewed as a model that makes the point that utterances often 
contain linguistic clues about their illocutionary force. Stampe's claim that 
Searle equates force and meaning points, therefore, to a fundamental tension 
in Searle, but one which I think can be resolved without threatening his 
50 central concepts of convention and rules (see SA, pp. 20, 21, 61). 
Stampe and Holdcroft share two general views in common: that Searle's PE 
is untenable, and that Searle is wrong in abolishing Austin's locutionary/ 
illocutionary distinction. 51 Since Holdcroft articulates these objections 
more completely than Stampe, I will state his case. Holdcroft initiates his 
argument by objecting to Searle's abolition of the locutionary/illocutionary 
distinction: "because, in his view, every sentence contains some indicator of 
i11ocutionary force, every such description is a description of an 
illocutionaryact . .,52 This is not quite true, because on Searle's account, 
context can serve the rule-govened function of determining il10cutionary force 
-25-
(SA, p. 36). Spooner illustrates the importance of context when he recalls 
the impression the Hungarian made on him: 
What he said ... all those years ago ... is neither here nor there. 
It was not what he said but possible the way he sat which has 
remained with me all my life and has, I am quite sure, made me 
what I am. (NML, p. 87) 
Before presenting Holdcroft's argument against Searle's Principle of 
Expressibility, let me begin by stating it: "for any meaning K and any 
speaker ~ whenever ~ means ... K then it is possible that there is some 
expression & such that & is an exact expression of or formulation of K" (SA, 
p. 20). As Searle says, though, the "expressibility" in PE does not refer to 
such things as complicated effects in listeners or obscure, private languages 
(SA, p. 20). Searle infers that PE "enables us to equate rules for performing 
speech acts with rules for uttering certain linguistic elements" (SA, p. 20). 
I agree with Holdcroft that this is false. 53 For, to hold this would be to 
commit the speech act fallacy that Searle claims to avoid (SA, p. 137). 
Further, it ignores the critical element of context that Searle himself 
articulates in the following rule: "K counts §J2 1: in context .Q" (SA, p. 36). 
It does not follow from this, however, that PE is false or untenable. 
There is a deep ambivalence, then, in Searle's attitude toward the 
connection between certain expressions and the speech acts they might be used 
to perform. Although he stresses context and wants to avoid the speech act 
fallacy, he is attracted to the notion of connecting certain words to certain 
actions. I think, however, that Searle's basic analysis is sound and that 
this ambivalence can be resolved by emphasizing context and deleting what 
appear to be commissions of the speech act fallacy from his theory. 
This brings me to the third type of objection, namely, the literary 
criticism objection. I will discuss three forms of literary objection to 
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Searle's speech act theory. In "The Problem of Inferred Modality in 
Narrative," Horst Ruthrof objects to Searle on three related grounds: first, 
and wrongly, that Searle assumes there is "perfect meaning exchange," in 
indirect speech acts, and second, that he "leaves out such important issues as 
the spatial position of the speaker and is vague about inferrable values and 
ideological commitment," and third, that "his starting point and method 
(propositional content modified by illocutionary features) deny him the full 
exploration of what goes on when we make meaning."S4 I think this third 
objection is also false; Searle's "starting point and method" isn't 
"propositional content modified by illocutionary force," nor is it clear that 
his program logically prevents a fuller study of context. The first and 
second points constitute only an incompleteness objection, calling for a more 
complete account of what Searle calls context. 
Altieri echoes this objection by claiming that Searle's theory is 
inherently unable to handle "social practices" and "actual conversations."S5 
Searle, according to Altieri, "tries to domesticate Austin within the confines 
of analytic philosophy."S6 This philosophy, he says, exhibits an 
"insensitivity to the expressive features of the speech acts he purports to 
analyze."S7 Like Ruthrof, however, Altieri fails to show that such a 
sensitivity to speech acts would be inconsistent with Searle's view. Still, 
Searle's theory (as it stands) seems to have little to say about Spooner's 
bizarre jeer at Hirst: 
Remember this. You've lost your wife of hazel hue, you've 
lost her and what can you do, she will no more come back to 
you, with a tillifola tillifola tillifoladi-foladi-foloo. 
(NML, p. 96) 
Claiming (wrongly) that Searle ignores context and style (and conventions like 
irony), Altieri rejects Searle's account as being useless for literary 
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criticism and takes up Paul Grice's account instead. 58 As I said, I think 
this ambivalence about context is resolvable within Searle's account, and I 
will show that Grice's analysis is not fundamentally incompatible with 
Searle's. 
In "How to Do Things With Austin and Searle," Stanley Fish writes a 
speech act analysis of Shakespeare's Coriolanus and concludes that speech act 
theory 
cannot possibly serve as an all purpose interpretive 
key .... it can't tell us anything about what happens after an 
illocutionary act has been performed (it is not a rhetoric); 
it can't tell us anything about the inner life of the 
performer59 ... it can't serve as the basis of a stylistics; 
it can't be elaborated into a poetics of narrative; it can't 
help us to tell the difference between literature and non-
literature; it can't distinguish between serious discourse 
and a work of fiction, and ~t cannot, without cheating, 
separate fiction from fact. 0 
This passage summarizes the literary objections I have outlined so far. Fish 
also objects to giving fiction the ontological status of parasitism, claiming 
that 'the distinction between fiction and serious discourse is not one of 
logical dependence but merely "one between two systems of discourse 
conventions. ,,61 That is, "words are responsible not to what is real but to 
what has been laid down as real ... by a set of constitutive rules.,,62 I think 
this objection is serious, and I suggest a solution to it below. 
With the exception of this parasitism objection, Fish's is also an 
incompleteness objection. His point seems to be that, since Austin and Searle 
don't settle these questions, these issues lie outside their theoretical 
jurisdiction. But in fact, several writers have successfully applied this 
contextual element of speech act theory to literary works. Mary Louise Pratt, 
for example, shows how speech act theory provides a way of talking about 
utterances 
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not only in terms of their surface grammatical 
but also in terms of the context in which they 





And, contrary to Fish, Pratt also believes that speech act theory IIdoes away 
with the distortive and misleading concepts of 'poetic' and 'ordinary' 
language.,,64 This type of move makes the theory's applicability to 
literature, especially Pinter plays, clear. I will summarize and respond to 
the three objections and then place my discussion of Pinter in the perspective 
of this analysis. 
The Derridean objection deals with the apparent inability of speech act 
theory to address the inherent indeterminacy of language. As I said, Derrida 
doesn't claim to fully discredit speech act theory; rather, he merely points 
to Austin's failure to take certain linguistic factors into account. Beyond 
this, it is important to recognize that Derrida's philosophical program 
differs in kind from Searle's in its emphasis on scepticism and that on its 
terms speech act theory (along with all other theoretical positions) is 
problematic. As Pinter's dialogue shows, moreover,' it doesn't follow from 
failures of language to communicate that speaking is not an intentional, rule-
governed activity. 
The philosophy of language objection demonstrates the ambivalence in 
Searle between avoiding context and blending meaning and illocutionary force; 
it also points out some of the shortcomings of the latter view. My view 
(although I won't prove it here) is that Searle's theory can survive a descent 
from this fence-sitting position firmly on the side of context. The literary 
criticism objection, as I said, picks up on this ambivalence and often wrongly 
interprets it as a logical shortcoming. Finally, the literary perspective 
rightly objects to Searle's view that literature is logically parasitic on 
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ordinary language. 
This view of literature as being parasitic paralells that of the critics 
who view Pinter's language as a variation on a supposedly normal type of 
language. This problematic notion can be overcome by adopting Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's concept of "language-game" "to bring into prominence the fact 
that the speaking; of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.,,65 
Wittgenstein views language as consisting of related uses of language whose 
"multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all. 1166 Further, 
these varied uses are interconnected in "a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing" he calls "family resemblances. ,,67 Such a view 
(as Quigley points out) can bypass the logical necessity of counter-intuitive 
notions like the parasitic status of literature. 
This non-hierarchical type of view, which is compatible with 
speech act theory, views literary forms as simply different (not logically 
dependent) types of language use. As Pinter's successful blend of naturalistic 
and stylized language shows, this model seems more accurate than one that 
privileges an unspecified, normal language use over others. Almansi and 
Henderson, following this Wittgensteinian approach, write, "Pinter's games of 
mimicry and agon are both, primarily, games involving language. ,,68 
Applying this concept to fictional literature in general, we can replace 
the idea of logical parasitism with Pratt's understanding of "literariness or 
poeticality" as "a particular disposition of speaker and audience with regard 
to the message, one that is characteristic of the literary speech 
situation. ,,69 
In "Logic and Conversation," Paul Grice incorporates context into speech 
act theory by building its analysis up from the foundation of conversation;70 
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this is accomplished by the "Cooperative Principle": "Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you 
are engaged.,,7l This approach differs from Searle's in that it avoids 
identifying linguistic rules with speech act rules, an equation that I think 
is mistaken (SA, p. 20). Still, with the exception of this view, Grice's 
approach does not run counter to his own (as Searle himself shows in "Indirect 
Speech Acts" 72 ). Thus, though less systematic, Grice's view is more 
accommodating to non-literal language uses and points the way to a revision 
and expansion of Searle's theory. As I see it, these two views are actually 
complementary, though different in focus. 
Since, as I hope I have shown, Searle's view is not essentially 
incompatible with those of Wittgenstein and Grice, it can therefore meet and 
overcome the force of the three objections I have raised. Searle's main 
hypothesis, that language use is governed by rules, is plausible, theoretically 
elegant, and also serves to shed light on literary works such as plays (SA, p. 
12). With the amendments I have proposed, I think Searle's theory offers a 
sound foundation for a theory of language. I leave this project of revision 
in sketch form and return to the plays and the question of the value of this 
analysis. 
The main challenge to a speech act approach to literature is simply how 
to apply the theory to specific texts. Making the connection between 
conversation and narrative (with the help of Grice), Pratt says, 
Natural Narratives formally acknowledge that in voluntarily 
committing ourselves to play the role of audience, we are 
accepting an exceptional or unusual imposition. This claim, 
I believe, holds for voluntary audience roles in general and 
is crucial to our understanding of the appropriateness 
conditions bearing on many kinds of speech situations, 
including literary ones. 73 
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The Bolsover street speech comes to mind. In that case, Spooner is the 
primary audience, and the theater audience is secondary. I think Pratt's 
choice of the word "audience" is no accident here, nor do I think it is an 
accident that Fish, Joseph Porter, and Shoshona Felman have all done speech 
act readings of plays. 74 Fish interestingly says that Coriolanus is "about 
speech acts," an observation that he uses to deny the general applicability of 
the theory to literature. 75 Porter's assertion is more general: 
A drama is a sequence of acts, verbal and nonverbal, done 
by a group of characters to or on each other .... The 
'speeches,' the bulk of the text, consist of the words 
in which the verbal action is done.,,76 
Felman's book compares the significance of promising in the Don Juan story 
(primarily in Moliere) to its significance in Austin's theory.77 
Altieri's view of a "dramatistic approach to speech acts" bears more than 
a metaphorical resemblance to Pratt's view and stresses the element of 
context. He says, "when we learn a language in a culture we develop powers to 
understand semantic properties in relation to several kinds of dramatistic 
contexts. 1178 
The study of Pinter is especially relevant to these types of contextual 
elements in language use. In Dialogue and Discourse, Dierdre Burton asks 
(about a typically elusive Pinter dialogue): "how do we know so much about the 
interactants in the dialogue?,,79 Her purpose in doing a sociolinguistic 
analysis of Pinter's sketch "Last to Go,,80 is "to specify how a given dialogue 
is like a naturally occurring conversation. ,,81 She is not so much concerned 
with the literary qualities of the work as the fact that, as Eric Salmon puts 
it, "almost all of Pinter's early characters speak the most accurate Cockney 
that has ever been written for the English stage.,,82 
All of this leads me to the following point: if speech act literary 
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criticism can offer a coherent approach to literary works, then drama is the 
most appropriate genre to which it can be applied. Just as New Criticism has 
poetry as its standard of interpretation and structuralist (and post-
structuralist) criticism typically analyzes narrative fiction, so I think 
. d h· . 83 drama is most su~te to speec act ~nterpretat~on. 
Because conversational dialogue is the primary form of utterance in 
drama, speech act theory offers a particularly valuable perspective to its 
interpretation. I think valuable dramatic criticism could be done with the 
slightly revised and expanded version of speech act theory that I sketched 
here. And unlike some forms of traditional criticism, this speech act theory 
would have the advantage of a basis in a rigorous philosophy of language. 
Searle (who sees works of fiction as pretended speech acts) says this 
about drama: 
the playwright's performance in writing the text of the play 
is rather like writing a recipe for pretense than engaging 
in a form of pretense itself .... the illocutionary force of 
the.tex~f a play is like the illocutionary force of a 
rec~pe. 
Although Searle probably commits the mimetic fallacy here (the idea that art 
should and does imitate reality), this passage is quite interesting. For, if the 
playwright's role resembles that of the recipe writer, then one of his 
challenges must be to anticipate a variety of performances (cooks and 
kitchens) and to avoid parochialism (little-known measuring units or 
unavailable ingredients). 
Pinter's concentration on the rich ambiguity and open-endedness of 
ordinary conversation satisfies these conditions to a point where the audience 
often engages in an act of creative interpretation that resembles the 
playwright's. But, as he has said, the rule "anything goes" never applies to 
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a Pinter play: 
I don't think that they [the plays] bear a very great amount 
of shifting and changing and different interpretations .... 
I think what has to be done is just to play the damn 
lines and stop, start, move and do it all very clearly 
and economically.8~G 
& Kind of Alaska and No Man's Land are, in different ways, about speech 
acts. The first centers on the difficulty of satisfying the conditions of an 
illocutionary speech act, and the second spotlights language as a deceitful 
tool of power and an unsatisfactory substitute for friendship. When Hirst 
responds to Spooner's offer of friendship with "No man's land ... does not 
move ... or change ... or grow old ... remains ... forever ... icy ... silent, " 
he chooses language (perhaps quoting from one of his own poems) over 
friendship (NML, p. 96). Because of Pinter's keen interest in communicative 
subtlety, it is easy to imagine speech act analyses of any of his plays. 
Rather than demonstrating a logical hierarchy of different language uses, 
Pinter's dialogue shows the opposite, namely, the interdependence ("family 
resemblances") between different types of language use. The blend of 
ordinary, British conversation with literary language, the lack of predictable 
causation from speech act to speech act, the persistent attention to the 
fragile complexity of speech acts, and the choice of extraordinary dramatic 
situations (both naturalistic and stylized) all figure in the "hyperrealistic" 
effects of Pinter's drama. 
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